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IMF programs consist of granting loans, and of conditionality that countries have to 
follow in order to qualify for them. The paper uses a pooled time-series cross section 
analysis, covering 98 countries over the period 1970-2000 in order to find out which 
effect IMF programs have on the personal and wage income distribution of the grant 
receiving country.  Similar to findings on growth (Dreher 2006), IMF programs have 
also a negative impact on income. This is due mainly to conditionality, whereas the 
amount of loans granted does not seem to harm.   
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 1. Introduction 
“The IMF works to foster global growth and economic stability. It provides policy advice and 
financing to members in economic difficulties and also works with developing nations to help 
them achieve macroeconomic stability and reduce poverty.” (IMF, 2009) 
In fighting the current financial crisis the International Monetary Fund (henceforth: 
IMF) has been provided with a central role. In April 2009, the G20 leaders decided to triple its 
budget to 750 billion dollars. The IMF will thus play an important role in granting loans to the 
countries most hurt by the financial crisis, and hence in the world economy. At the same time 
however, concerns about the effects of IMF programs have not diminished.      
Many  studies  have  already  been  performed  into  the  effect  of  IMF  programs  on 
economic growth, the outcomes of which are not giving rise to great optimism (see section 
2.1). For an organization of which a former managing director has often expressed that its 
'main goal is growth’ (Camdessus,  1990, cited in Przeworski & Vreeland, 2000), this comes 
as a shock. An important contribution in this respect has been made by Dreher (2006), who 
attempted to discover how this paradox occurred by separating the different economic policy 
instruments of an IMF program, which are loans granted and conditionality set for granting a 
loan. In addition he analyzes the effect of IMF policy advice and of moral hazard. He then 
studied their isolated effects on growth.  
At least as controversial is the effect of  IMF programs on the income  distribution in the 
program-country. NGOs like Oxfam (see Oxfam, 2007), Caritas (2003), Global Exchange 
(2005) and the few existing empirical studies (see Pastor 1987, Garuda 2000 and Vreeland 
2002) have been strongly criticizing the IMF for the supposedly adverse effects of its policies 
on poverty and inequality, an accusation clearly contradicting the official aims of the Fund 
(IMF 2009). It must be noted that the IMF has not always been as focused on the income  
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distribution as it is nowadays. Originally, the main mission of the IMF has been to provide 
financial assistance to member countries in balance of payment need. The oil shock of the 
1970s and the debt crisis of the 1980s caused more and more low- and lower middle income 
countries to become IMF borrowers (IMF, 2009). In addition, more and more of the Fund’s 
support  extended  over  longer  periods.  This  all  affected  the  way  the  IMF  (and  the  world 
society) looked at the effects of its policies on poverty and the income distribution in those 
countries (Polak, 1991).The IMF had to re-identify its goals in a new international setting of 
liberalization,  where  it  suffered  itself  from  ‘the  failure  of  market-driven  globalization  to 
deliver sustained growth and diminished inequality’ (Evans and Finnemore 2001).  
   Starting in 1990, the Managing Director of the IMF stated that “our primary objective 
is… high-quality growth,” not merely “growth for the privileged few, leaving the poor with 
nothing but empty promises” (Camdessus, 1990, cited in Vreeland, 2002). Today, developing 
countries have a number of programs available
1 and reducing poverty is among the IMF's 
official aims (IMF 2009). Among the few empirical studies available on the effect of the IMF 
on inequality - scarce mainly due to a lack of reliable data - the most advanced study is 
Vreeland  (2002),  who  was  the  first  to  use  regression  analysis  to  control  for  non-random 
selection into an IMF program. He found a negative effect of IMF programs on the income 
share of labor in the manufacturing sector, a result in line with earlier less-advanced studies 
which found a negative effect of IMF programs on both inequality and poverty (see section 
2.2). Again, this result clearly contradicts the IMF’s aim. Taking into account the negative 
                                                 
1 Developing countries can borrow at concessional rates under the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF). Non-concessional loans are mainly provided through 
the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), aimed at longer-term problems and the Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), which 
have a (shorter) length of between 12 and 24 months (see, amongst others, the website of the IMF for detailed 
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effect of IMF programs on economic growth, this is a very disturbing result. More so, in view 
of the IMF’s most recent task, to fight the current financial crisis, which is largely caused by 
income and wealth inequalities (Leijonhuvfud 2009), and might lead to even more inequality 
(Atkinsons 2008). Is it really so that for IMF programs there exists no equity-efficiency trade-
off, as simply both suffer?  
Building on Dreher’s (2006) instrumental variable approach to overcome the selection 
problem (see section 2), this paper will be the first to analyze the effects of IMF programs on 
both personal income inequality  and on industrial pay inequality.
2   It thereby  extends on 
Vreeland (2002) and Garuda (2000), which restricted their analysis either to industrial pay 
inequality or did not do a regression analysis. In the literature so far, the different channels 
through which the IMF programs directly or indirectly affect the income distribution have 
been identified. These channels are reductions in the budget deficit, currency devaluation, 
changes  in  growth  rates,  changes  in  inflation  rates  and  trade  liberalization.  However,  the 
studies did not distinguish between the different economic policy instruments included in an 
IMF program. This paper is the first to split the total effect of IMF programs into the effect of 
the pure money being spent, i.e. the size of IMF loans, and the effect of conditionality and 
policy  advice  which  is  related  to  the  granting  of  the  loans.  Understanding  the  exact 
relationship  between  Fund  programs  and  possibly  growing  inequality  can help  alleviating 
these effects. We use a pooled time-series cross section analysis, covering 98 countries
3 over 
the period 1970-2000.   
In  the  following  section,  a  short  overview  of  the  literature  on  the  effect  of  IMF 
programs, will be provided. Hereafter, the theoretical linkages between IMF programs and the 
income distribution will be discussed and the empirical analysis performed. 
                                                 
2Inequality measures used are the Gini-index, a measure of household income inequality, and a Theil coefficient 
measuring industrial pay-inequality. As the former includes income from all sources, including social security 
programs, while the latter only looks at the reward for labor, more specific conclusions about the impact of IMF 
programs can be drawn. 
3 Country selection is driven by data availability. See the appendix for all included countries.   
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2. IMF Programs: A Short Overview of the Empirical Literature 
 
The empirical literature on the effect of IMF programs on growth is huge and has recently 
made great advances with respect to the selection problem and isolating the effects of the 
different elements of IMF programs. Those improvements have generally not yet reached the 
much  smaller  IMF  &  inequality  literature.  Without  pretending  to  be  comprehensive,  this 
section will provide a short overview of both the growth- and the inequality literature, and 
then point out how recent improvements in the research methods of the former can be applied 
to the latter. 
2.1 IMF & Growth 
Studies into the effect of IMF programs on economic growth can generally be split up into 
three categories (see, amongst others, Gould 2005 and Dreher 2006). 
The first approach is that of 'with-without' comparisons, comparing the growth rates of 
a  group  of  program  countries  with  a  control  group  consisting  of  countries  without  such 
programs.    These  comparisons  do  not  control  for  the  basic  differences  between  IMF 
borrowers  and  others  countries,  thus  ignoring  the  fact  that  IMF  borrowers  might  be 
systematically worse off (Gould, 2005).  
Other studies use a so-called 'before-after' comparison, comparing growth rates before 
the  IMF  program  has  been  approved  with  its  value  after  the  program,  attributing  any 
difference to the program. This approach ignores all the other possible causes of changing 
growth rates. Moreover, by ignoring the fact that IMF programs are usually the result of a 
crisis (and hence are far from exogenous), this method is likely to judge the effect of IMF 
programs too negatively (Dreher, 2006). 
The  method  used  most  by  recent  studies  is  that  of  regression  analysis.  Here  the 
prospects of tackling the endogeneity-problem are most promising (Dreher, 2006).  Where the  
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with-without and before-after studies generally did not find a clear effect on growth (for an 
overview of the literature, see Dreher 2006 or Gould 2005), more recent regression analyses 
generally do. For example, Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) found that IMF programs have a 
negative effect on growth in the short run, and do not help in the long run. Also Barro and Lee 
(2005)  and  Dreher  (2006)  find  a  direct  negative  effect  of  IMF  program  participation  on 
growth. 
Even though the negative effect of IMF programs on economic growth becomes more 
and more established, none of these studies clearly separates all the different channels through 
which the IMF can influence growth. This is where Dreher (2006) makes his contribution. He 
distinguishes  four  ways  in  which  the  IMF  can  influence  growth.  First,  an  IMF  program 
supplies a certain amount of loans (money). This money can have multiple effects: while it is 
meant to restructure the economy, it might in practice also reduce the government's incentives 
to reform by increasing governments' leeway. Second, following the moral hazard hypothesis, 
the "availability of  IMF money may deteriorate economic policy  even  before it has been 
disbursed".  By interpreting IMF lending as a subsidized income insurance against adverse 
shocks, the incentives to take precaution against this are reduced.  Dreher and Vaubel (2004) 
found  that  countries  with  higher  IMF  loans  available  indeed  follow  more  expansionary 
policies. Third, the IMF attaches conditionality to its loans. Fourth, the IMF often supplies 
policy advice. Dreher found a negative effect of IMF loans (money), a small mitigating effect 
from compliance to conditionality, and, once loans and compliance were controlled for, an 
additional negative effect of IMF programs which he suspected to be caused by either moral 
hazard or bad policy advice. 
2.2 IMF & Inequality 
The literature on IMF and inequality is huge (see e.g Abdalla. Ismail-Sabri (1980), Handa and 
King  (1997),  Development  Gap  (1998))  however  empirical  proof  of  a  negative  effect  is  
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scarce. The first to examine this relationship was Pastor (1987), who performed a 'before-
after' analysis analyzing the effect of IMF programs on the wage share of the Net Domestic 
Product. He concluded that IMF programs redistribute income away from workers. Although 
he also included a control-group with non-program countries, his approach did not adequately 
deal with the selection problem (Vreeland, 2002). 
Garuda (2000) was the first to explicitly address the selection problem in his study into 
the effect of  IMF programs on Gini-coefficients and incomes of the poor. However, data 
problems  restricted  him  from  using  regression-based  modeling.  Instead,  he  controls  for 
selection by splitting the countries up into groups with different propensity-scores
4. He finds 
that “participation in Fund programs may have important distributional effects, and both the 
direction and magnitude of these effects may depend critically on a country’s pre-program 
economic situation”, more specifically a country’s balance of payments situation. 
Vreeland (2002) was the first, and so far the only one, to address the selection problem 
using regression-based modeling. He studied the effect of IMF programs on the income share 
of labor, and found that this effect was negative. His conclusion was that IMF programs have 
negative distributional consequences. The novelty of his study was his large dataset (2,095 
observations of 110 countries over the period 1961–1993), which allowed him to address the 
selection problem in a more adequate fashion. This dataset had the downside however that it 
only dealt with one sector of the  economy, the manufacturing sector.  Vreeland also only 
looked at the effect of IMF program participation, thereby not investigating the effects of the 
separate elements of IMF programs (such as disbursed money and conditionality). 
                                                 
4 Propensity scores are scores “measuring the probability that a country would request Fund assistance in a given 
year based on its economic circumstances”, see Garuda (2000)  
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3. Data & Methodology 
This study makes use of a pooled time-series cross section analysis, covering 98 countries
5 
over the period 1970-2000. It builds on a dataset created by Dreher (2006) augmented by 
variables mainly derived from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Five year 
averages  are  used  of  all  variables
6,  allowing  inclusion  of  several  variables  that  are  not 
available on a yearly basis. Moreover, the inequality indices used as independent variables are 
relatively stable over time, so that little information is lost by using averages. As not all of the 
data is available for all countries or periods, the dataset is unbalanced 
For income inequality, as dependent variable, the Gini-index and the Theil-coefficient 
for  industrial  pay-inequality  are  used.  The  selection  of  those  is  strongly  driven  by  the 
availability  of  data,  which  is  a  major  problem  for  empirical  (cross-national)  studies  into 
inequality. As the Gini-coefficient includes all household income while the Theil-coefficient 
only looks at the reward for labor, using them both seems promising in order to learn about 
specific impacts of IMF programs.  
3.1 The Theil-Coefficient as dependent variable 
The Theil-coefficient of inequality (often also referred to as Theil's T-statistic) generates an 
element for each individual or group in the analysis which "weighs the data point’s size (in 
terms of population share) and weirdness (in terms of proportional distance from the mean)" 
(UTIP, 2009). Hence, when using individual data each individual's element is determined by 
his proportional distance from the mean.  The Theil-coefficient is then computed as follows: 
             
        (1)                              
 
                                                 
5 Country selection is driven by data availability. See the appendix for all included countries.  
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where n is the number of individuals in the population, µy is the population’s average income 
and yp is the income of the person indexed by p. When all persons have the same income, the 
coefficient equals zero (as emphasized by the last term of equation (1)).  Incomes below the 
mean lower the coefficient, incomes above the mean increase it. More income inequality leads 
to a higher Theil-coefficient; the upper bound is given by ln(n). The fact that the upper bound 
depends on population size represents a major problem when using the Theil-coefficient in 
cross-national comparisons. 
If however members of a society can be split up in mutually exclusive and completely 
exhaustive  groups  then  the  Theil-coefficient  exists  of  two  elements:  the  between-groups 
inequality and the within-in group inequality.   The between-groups  element is defined as 
following (see Hale, 2003): 




Where i now indexes the groups, pi the size of group i, and P the total population. The 
upper bound is now given by the natural logarithm of the total population divided by the size 
of the smallest group. This is reached when the smallest group holds all the resources. The 
between-groups element of inequality represents a lower bound for total inequality. Moreover, 
if  a  consistent  group  structure  is  used  in  measurements  taken  in  different  countries,  the 
between-groups measure of inequality is a reasonable robust proxy for the relative degree of 
inequality in the those different countries (Galbraith, 2007), so that it can also be used in 
international comparisons. The great advantage of this measure is that the data requirements 
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comprehensive overview of the interesting properties of Theil's inequality measure, including 
treatment of the within-groups element of the Theil-coefficient see Hale (2003). 
The data used in this study comes from the University of Texas Inequality Project - 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UTIP-UNIDO) dataset. Standardized 
categories are used to facilitate international comparison. After having taken averages, the 
dataset contains 388 Theil-coefficients.  
3.2 The Gini-Index as dependent variable 
The Gini index is perhaps the world's best known inequality measure. It is defined as half of 
the average of the absolute differences between all pairs of incomes, the total then being 
normalized  on  mean  income  (Barr,  2004).  The  Gini-coefficient  has  a  minimum  of  zero 
(perfect equality) and a maximum of one, the Gini-index used in this study is equal to the 
Gini-coefficient times 100. 
The meaning of the Gini is not always clear: when Lorenz curves cross, its gives 
ambiguous results. Moreover, it is based on a social welfare function in which the highest 
income has a weight of 1, the second highest has a weight of 2, etc. This is a completely 
arbitrary  welfare  function.  Also,  redistribution  from  the  very  rich  to  the  rich  might  be 
associated with the same change in the Gini-index as redistribution from the middle class to 
the poor. Nevertheless, Garuda (2000) found a very strong relation between the Gini index 
and the income of the poorest quintile. For this reason he concluded that "such trends must be 
verified empirically and do not necessarily hold as a mathematical proposition." 
Data for the Gini coefficient derives from Deininger and Squire (1996) and the World 
Development Indicators (2002). After having taken five year averages, the dataset contains 
263 Gini-coefficients.  
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3.3 The Control Variables 
The right-hand side variables include the IMF variables (to be discussed below) and control 
variables that are known determinants of inequality. Data restrictions pose a few limitations to 
the selection of variables. As this study includes a large share of developing countries, the 
control variables derive from a study done by Li et al (1998) aimed at explaining inequality in 
especially developing countries.  
In their empirical analysis they find a measure for political liberty and the extent of 
initial secondary school enrollment to be important determinants of income inequality. In our 
paper, an index of the freedom of press (Freedom House, Press Freedom Survey) is included 
to proxy political freedom, and instead of the initial level of education, the five year lag of 
gross secondary school enrollment is used.   
According to Li et al (1998), imperfections in the financial system (which limit access 
to the financial system especially for the poor) are found to have a significant determinant of 
inequality  and  seem  to  be  even  more  important  than  political  freedom.  The  measure  of 
financial development (M2/GDP) used in this paper is the same as in Li et al (1998).  
All  variables  used  by  Li  indicate  that  the  rich  can  retain  their  wealth,  which  asks  for  a 
measure of the initial distribution of income. For this they include the Gini coefficient of the 
initial distribution of land as a proxy for the initial distribution of assets and the initial level of 
real GDP. A measure for the initial division of assets is missing as this was not available for 
the majority of countries included in our analysis; however the inclusion of country dummies 
covers for differences between countries such as initial wealth distribution.  Time dummies 
cover for possible time trends. 
In appendix C regression results of the above mentioned control variables on Gini- and 
Theil- coefficients are shown. Country differences account for a vast part of the variation, the 
variables  proposed  by  Li  et  al  (1998)  are  not  all  significant.  Surprising  is  the  effect  of  
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'financial  development'  (M2/GDP),  which  reduces  industrial-pay  inequality  but  increases 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. One explanation could be that monetarization 
of the economy in developing countries takes place only in the industrial sector, while the rest 
of the economy, mainly the rural part, stays outside this development (see Unger & Siegel 
2006 for Suriname). 
3.4 The IMF Variables as independent variables and Instrument variables 
The  IMF  provides  loans  and  attaches  conditions  to  those  loans  plus  gives  policy  advice. 
Through  these  diverse  policy  instruments,  different  effects  might  be  created  along  the 
channels that affect income distribution, which range from budget cuts to trade liberalization.  
Only  the  effect  of  IMF  loans  can  be  directly  measured,  using  the  amount  of  IMF  credit 
supplied in percentage of GDP. Measuring the effect of conditionality and policy advice is 
more problematic. However, by adding a dummy for an IMF program being in effect
7 a first 
distinction can be made: the effect of policy advice and conditions is covered by the dummy, 
while the effect of money supplied is covered by the IMF loans-variable. 
To be able to distinguish between policy advice and conditionality, Dreher (2006) 
proposes various variables measuring compliance with conditionality. If a variable measuring 
compliance is included, the dummy for existing IMF programs can cover the effect of policy 
advice.  All  measures  of  compliance  however  suffer  from  one  major  problem:  a  lack  of 
available data, which combined with the limited availability of data on income inequality has 
such an adverse effect on the number of observations that a reliable analysis is no longer 
possible. Data problems therefore do not allow us to further separate  policy advice from 
conditionality. 
                                                 
7 The dummy equals one if an IMF program has been in effect for at least five months in a given year, so that 
only years are included in which an IMF program ran for a significant period.  
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A  second  problem  is  the  endogeneity  of  IMF  programs.  Many  authors  have 
acknowledged that countries are not randomly selected into IMF programs (see section two). 
IMF loans are usually given to countries in economic problems. Just as it 'would be perverse 
to blame motorway accidents on ambulances, even though they appear every time there is 
one' (Evans, 1998 in Barr, 2004), it would be similarly unfair to blame the IMF for all the 
(economic) problems in the countries they assist. 
Hence,  as  the  circumstances  between  program-  and  non-program  countries  differ 
systematically (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000) there is a selection problem. Causation needs 
to be sorted out: effects of IMF programs must be distinguished from the effects of the initial 
income distribution on the probability and size of the programs. Ideally, one would need an 
experiment in which the IMF randomly assigns loans to countries, regardless of their initial 
conditions. Barro & Lee (2005), and later also Dreher (2006), try to approximate such an 
experiment by using instrumental variables for IMF loans. Those variables should on the one 
hand be good predictors of IMF loans and on the other hand be exogenous with respect to, in 
the case of this paper, inequality (see Barro & Lee, 2005).  
As  the  instrumental  variable  approach  is  new  in  the  IMF  &  inequality  strand  of 
literature,  inspiration  for  instruments  typically  follows  from  other  strands  of  empirical 
literature on the IMF. One instrument “typically employed” (Dreher, 2006) is voting in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.   Dreher’s dummy is used and equals 1 if the 
borrowing country votes in line with the average of the G7 countries (weighted with their 
quota in the IMF), and 0 otherwise. As the G7 countries are in control of the IMF, it is to be 
expected that closer allies receive more programs and larger loans. 
Other instruments typically used in the empirical IMF literature include the degree of 
democracy, as it has often been claimed that the IMF supports undemocratic regimes and, for 
similar reasons, a measure for freedom of the press. In addition, the share of foreign short- 
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term debt in total foreign debt, total debt service in percent of GDP, the size of a country's 
quota at the IMF, LIBOR on three months credit to US banks, GDP per capita and the square 
of GDP per capita, a dummy for special interest governments, a dummy for proportional 
representation,  international  reserves  (in  months  of  imports),  foreign  direct  investment 
relative to GDP,  a measure for the rule of law, the rate of monetary expansion, the duration of 
the political regime and the number of years left in the chief executive’s current term are used 
(for a description of the data see appendix one. All instruments mentioned are suggested in 
Dreher (2006) or Barro and Lee (2005)). In addition to these instruments we include dummies 
for banking- and currency crises, as IMF programs are typically concluded after a crisis. 
Instruments  should  satisfy  two  requirements:  they  must  be  correlated  with  the 
endogenous  explanatory  variable  and  they  must  be  uncorrelated  with  the  error  term 
(Woolridge, 2006), i.e. be exogenous with respect to inequality. Regressions will be run to 
find instruments that have significant explanatory power. The Sargan test for over-identifying 
restrictions  will  be  conducted  to  ensure  that  the  instruments  are  uncorrelated  with  the 
structural error. 
Regressions explaining the IMF variables first included all the instruments mentioned, 
except for democracy and freedom of the press which are on theoretical grounds found to be 
far from exogenous
8, and a dummy for each country. The estimation method is Generalized 
Least Squares, as this produces heteroskedasticity-robust results and allows estimation in the 
presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels. An AR(1) term was included to correct for 
serial correlation where necessary
9. As the goal was purely to find instruments with sufficient 
explanatory power, the variable with the lowest t-value was eliminated after every regression, 
                                                 
8 Freedom of the press is included as control variable explaining inequality, see section 4.1 for the theoretical 
background of this.  
9 An AR(1) term is included when  Woolridge’s (2002, 282-283) test for serial correlation rejects the hypothesis 
that there is no serial correlation at the 10% level.  
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eventually only keeping variables that are significant at the 10%-level (all country dummies 
are kept regardless of their significance). The results are presented in table one. 
 
Table 1. Instruments for IMF programs and  IMF loans (GLS, 98 countries, 1970-2000) 









Short-term debt (% total debt)  -.008 (0.00)  Total debt service (% GDP)  0.366 (0.00) 
Voting in General Assembly  .473 (0.01)  Voting in General Assembly  -5.228 (0.00) 
Currency crisis  .289 (0.00)  Current account balance (% GDP)  -0.093 (0.01) 
   
International reserves (in months of 
imports) 
0.112 (0.10) 
       
Number of observations  346  Number of observations  399 
Chi-square (Prob. > F)  288.07 (0.00)  Chi-square (Prob. > F)  1589.11 (0.00) 
Dummies are included for each country 
As can be read in table 1, three significant predictors for IMF programs
10 remain. Voting in 
line with the G7 in the UN General Assembly and the occurrence of a currency crisis both 
increase the likelihood of program participation. Those results are as expected; a currency 
crisis increases demand, while voting in line with the G7 is likely to increase the availability 
of IMF programs (as described above). A higher short term debt is likely to reduce IMF 
supply (Dreher and Vaubel 2004), so all signs are pointing in the right direction.   
  In the regression explaining IMF credit, total debt service has the expected positive 
sign  as  a  higher  debt  service  increases  demand  for  IMF  loans.  A  better  current  account 
balance decreases the size of IMF loans, possibly through lower demand. Bigger international 
reserves increase IMF supply, as this reduces the risk that a country can not pay back its 
loans. 
                                                 
10 IMF programs include all types of IMF programs, whereas Dreher (2006) only included Stand-By and EFF 
arrangements. His reasons for this included the (lack of) availability of compliance-data, which is of no concern 
in this study. Additionally, our data on IMF loans as percentage of GDP includes all types of IMF loans.  
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The most surprising result is the coefficient on voting in line with the G7, which is 
significantly negative. Thus, where the hypothesis was that closer allies of the G7 receive 
both more programs and larger loans, it appears that they receive more programs but smaller 
loans relative to GDP. This is a result that deserves some attention, as in both regressions the 
G7-variable has a large explanatory power. A possible explanation is that countries voting in 
line with the G7 are economically more developed than those that don't
11; in that case they are 
considered more trustworthy by the IMF (so that they have easier access to IMF programs), 
but they need less money (so that they get smaller loans).  A second, easier, explanation might 
be the (on average) higher GDP of the in line-voting countries. When splitting up our sample 
in two groups, one that scores  below the mean with respect to voting in line in the General 
Assembly and one that scores above, the average GDP of the second group is roughly 2.5 
times as big as that of the first group. If the size of loans does not increase proportionally with 
GDP 
12 this can also explain the negative coefficient. 
3.5 Econometric Methods 
The  methods  employed  largely  follow  Dreher  (2006).  First,  the  equations  explaining  the 
Theil- and Gini coefficients will be estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). 
This takes the information from the equations explaining IMF-program participation and the 
size of IMF loans (table 1) into account. This method is consistent and more efficient than 
OLS (Dreher, 2006). 
To account for the likely endogeneity problem the SUR analysis is replicated using the 
instrumental variables for IMF variables derived in section 4.2. The estimation is performed 
using three-stage least squares (3SLS). The use of 3SLS allows for different error variances in 
                                                 
11 An indication, though certainly not a proof, is that the correlation between voting in line and both GDP and 
GDP per capita  is positive.    
12 While GDP size has not been found significant in the regressions explaining the IMF variables, there is a 
negative correlation between GDP size and loans as a percentage of GDP.  
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each period and the correlation of these errors over time (Barro & Lee, 2005). It is consistent 
and in general more efficient as compared to two-stage least squares (Dreher, 2006).  
Potential  simultaneity  arises  in  the  case  of  one  variable,  financial  development 
(M2/GDP), as this runs the risk of being affected by IMF programs and/or loans.  For this 
reason M2/GDP is instrumented using its own lagged value.  
4. Results: Effects of IMF Programs & Loans 
In this section the effects of IMF involvement on respectively the Theil- and Gini-coefficient 
will be shown. For both the Theil- and Gini regressions three specifications of the model will 
be used: One including only a dummy for IMF program participation, one including only IMF 
credit as percentage of GDP and one including both variables simultaneously. 
4.1 Results for the Theil-Coefficient 
Table 2 shows the SUR-results for the Theil-coefficient. The coefficients might seem small, 
but it must be taken into account that the mean value of the Theil-coefficient is only 0.07 
(standard  deviation  0.05).  Financial  development  significantly  reduces  inequality  in  all 
specifications; the other control variables are not significant. Due to the high explanatory 
power of especially the country dummies (in line with the results derived by Li et al), the R-





Table 2. Regressions for Theil-coefficients, SUR (p-values in parentheses),  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
IMF Program  0.019 (0.01)    0.021 (0.01)  
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IMF Credit (% GDP)    0.001 (0.23)  0.000 (0.77) 
Financial Development*  -0.001 (0.00)  -0.001 (0.00)  -0.001 (0.00) 
Secondary school 
enrollment, t-1 
0.000 (0.96)  0.000 (0.88)  0.000 (0.89) 
Freedom of the Press  0.000 (0.94)  0.000 (0.64)  0.000 (0.89) 
Nr of observations  212  249  206 
Chi-square (Prob. > F)  588.55   (0.00)  721.16   (0.00)  583.22   (0.00) 
R-squared  0.73  0.74  0.74 
Regressions take the information from table 1 into account. Dummies are included for each country 
and time period. * instrumented using its own lagged value.  
 
As to the IMF variables, participating in an IMF program significantly increases inequality in 
both the first and third specification. The loans supplied by the IMF do not affect inequality in 
any of the specifications.  
In table 3, the IMF variables are instrumented using the variables from table 1. All 
instruments are jointly significant in explaining the IMF variables and pass the Sargan test, 
conducted to ensure that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. The results for 
the control variables do not change, with financial development still being the only significant 
one.  IMF  programs  still  significantly  increase  industrial  pay-inequality  at  the  5%  level. 
Moreover, the coefficient has become three times as big. IMF loans themselves still do not 
have any effect. 
 
Table 3 . Regressions for Theil-coefficients, IMF variables instrumented, 3SLS (p-values in 
parentheses) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  
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IMF Program  0.058 (0.02)    0.056 (0.05) 
IMF Credit (% GDP)    0.003 (0.28)  0.001 (0.62) 
Financial Development*  -0.001 (0.04)  -0.001 (0.00)  -0.002 (0.00) 
Secondary school 
enrollment, t-1 
0.000 (0.86)  0.000 (0.84)  0.000 (0.87) 
Freedom of the Press  0.000 (0.99)  0.000 (0.67)  0.000 (0.82) 
Nr of observations  212  249  206 
Chi-square (Prob. >F)  529.25 (0.00)  2572.94  (0.00)  533.49  (0.00) 
Joint significance of 
instruments (Prob. > F) 
0.00  0.00   
Sargan test (Prob. >F)  0.19  0.21   
R-squared  0.69  0.73  0.69 
Dummies are included for each country and time period (results not reported). IMF variables are 
instrumented using the regressions in table 1: IMF Program  is instrumented with short-term debt as 
percentage of total debt, voting in the General Assembly and a dummy for currency crises. IMF Credit  
is instrumented with total debt as percentage of GDP, voting in the General Assembly, the current 
account balance in percentage of GDP and the international reserves in months of imports. * 
instrumented using its own lagged value.  
4.2 Results for the Gini-Index 
The results from the SUR regression for the Gini-index are displayed in table 4. Contrary to 
the results for the Theil-coefficient, secondary school enrollment is a significant predictor of 
inequality in all specifications, while financial development is not significant even at the 10% 
level.    
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The coefficient on IMF programs is positive and significant at the 10% level in the 
first specification, and positive and just not significant in the last. IMF loans again never are 
significant. 
 
Table 4. Regressions for Gini-coefficients, SUR (p-values in parentheses)  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
IMF Program  1.560 (0.09)    1.516 (0.11) 
IMF Credit (% GDP)    .1201684 (0.32)  -0.015 (0.91) 
Financial Development*  -0.041 (0.47)  -.0324665 (0.56)  -0.038 (0.51) 
Secondary school 
enrollment, t-1 
-0.106 (0.05)  -.1201055 (0.02)  -0.100 (0.06) 
Freedom of the Press  0.005 (0.75)  .0010379 (0.95)  0.005 (0.76) 
Nr of observations  161  181  159 
Chi-square (Prob. > F)  38951.88  (0.00)  46623.38  (0.00)  1382.97  (0.00) 
R-squared  0.90  0.91  0.90 
Regressions take the information from table 1 into account. Dummies are included for each country 
and time period. * instrumented using its own lagged value. 
 
When  using  instruments  for  the  IMF  variables  the  signs  of  the  control  variables  do  not 
change, though secondary school enrollment looses significance in the last specification. 
The  results  for  the  IMF  variables  are  however  much  stronger  here.  IMF  program 
participation has a large and significant negative effect on the income distribution. When 
included  on  their  own  IMF  loans  have  a  positive  effect,  though  only  significant  at  a 
(hypothetical) 20% level.  
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When programs and loans are included simultaneously, both are significant at the 5% 
level. Moreover, both the positive and the negative coefficient become stronger, indicating a 
negative role for IMF programs but a mitigating role for the money disbursed. The fact that 
the size of loans does not have a mitigating effect on the Theil-coefficient of industrial pay-
inequality while it does have this effect on the Gini deserves some more attention. The crucial 
difference between this Theil-coefficient and the Gini-index is that the former only includes 
working people, while the latter includes everyone, including those on welfare. From the 
results presented in table 5 it thus appears that governments use IMF money for policies 
which mitigate the effect of IMF programs. This result is in line with Dreher and Vaubel, 
2004, who found that countries with higher IMF loans follow a more expansionary economic 
policy.  
The third specification also provides an interesting illustration of the 'net effect' of 
resorting to the IMF. As an example we can (using mean values) compare a country with an 
'average' use of IMF programs and loans with a country not resorting to the IMF at all. The 
mean program duration is 1.5 year, the median loan is equal to 2.5 % of GDP.  This IMF 
program increases the Gini by 2.60 points. The size of the loan lowers the Gini by 2.1 points, 







Table 5. Regressions for Gini-coefficients, IMF variables instrumented, 3SLS (p-values in 
parentheses)  
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  (1)  (2)  (3) 
IMF Program  5.418 (0.07)    9.072 (0.01) 
IMF Credit (% GDP)    -.348 (0.16)  -0.826 (0.01) 
Financial Development*  -0.039 (0.50)  -.015 (0.78)  -0.006 (0.92) 
Secondary school 
enrollment, t-1 
-0.096 (0.08)  -.122 (0.01)  -0.082 (0.14) 
Freedom of the Press  0.007 (0.69)  -.001(0.97)  0.006 (0.70) 
Nr of observations  161  181  159 
Chi-square (Prob. >F)  1236.29   (0.00)  1550.68  (0.00)  24821.03   (0.00) 
Joint significance of 
instruments (Prob. > F) 
0.00  0.00   
Sargan test (Prob. >F)  0.25  0.26   
R-squared  0.88  0.89  0.83 
Dummies are included for each country and time period (results not reported). IMF variables are 
instrumented using the regressions in table 1: IMF Program  is instrumented with short-term debt as 
percentage of total debt, voting in the General Assembly and a dummy for currency crises. IMF Credit  
is instrumented with total debt as percentage of GDP, voting in the General Assembly, the current 
account balance in percentage of GDP and the international reserves in months of imports. * 
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Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper raised the question whether it is the case that, besides restraining growth, IMF 
programs  also  harm  the  distribution  of  income.  Sadly,  the  answer  to  this  question  is 
affirmative. Hence, IMF involvement not only reduces the size of the pie, but also causes it to 
be split in a more unequal way. It is regretful that not even the trade-off between efficiency 
and equity, usually postulated in economics, seems to exist. This result is confirmed, and 
becomes  even  stronger,  when  using  instrumental  variables  to  account  for  non-random 
selection. 
The negative result for IMF programs is in line with the literature.
13 Being the only 
paper besides Vreeland (2002) to use regression based modeling to account for the selection 
problem, this study included two novelties: Firstly, it distinguished between IMF programs as 
a  whole  and  the  size  of  IMF  loans,  in  order  to  filter  out  the  effect  of  different  policy 
instruments  involved  in  an  IMF  program.  Secondly,  it  used  both  a  measure  of  personal 
income inequality and a measure for industrial pay-inequality.   
From this some interesting conclusions can be derived. Firstly, in all specifications of 
the  model,  using  instrumental  variables  or  not,  IMF  programs  significantly  increase 
inequality.  Earlier  papers  finding  similar  results  found  forced  reductions  in  government 
deficits, currency devaluations, changes in growth & inflation rates (see Garuda, 2000) and 
trade liberalisation (see Vreeland, 2002) as possible explanations for this adverse effect.  
Secondly, generally speaking, it is the presence of an IMF program, not the size of the 
loan that matters. To be more precise, the size of the loan never has a negative influence. 
When  using  instrumental  variables,  it  appears  that  bigger  IMF  loans  actually  have  a 
                                                 
13 A recent conference paper by Valerie Frey and Ethan Siller seems to arrive at a different conclusion with 
regard to the effect of IMF conditionality on inequality. However, at this moment only the abstract is publicly 
available, which makes it impossible to compare results and methodology in more detail.  
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mitigating effect on the Gini-index. On industrial pay-inequality IMF loans do not have any 
significant influence.  
Of course, not finding any econometric influence does not necessarily mean that there 
is none. However, at the very least, it appears that IMF loans do more to mitigate general 
income inequality than they do to reduce industrial pay-inequality. Combining this with the 
finding  that  larger  IMF  loans  lead  to  a  more  expansionary  economic  policy  (Dreher  and 
Vaubel, 2004) provides an indication of possible use of IMF money to improve for example 
welfare programs. 
This  is  however  not  enough  to  offset  the  negative  impact  of  IMF  programs.  As 
programs consist of loans, policy advice and policy conditions, it is a reasonably devastating 
result  that  after  controlling  for  the  loans,  programs  have  such  a  negative  impact  on  the 
distribution of income. One of the problems certainly is that economic models are based on 
assumptions about functioning markets, which do not exist in many developing countries. The 
IMF  itself  realizes  that  institutions  play  an  important  role  for  understanding  developing 
countries (see Evans and Finnemore 2001). And the IMF’s task is not easy. If it only gives the 
money without conditionality, loans risk to disappear in the pockets of corrupt politicians or 
civil servants. If it sets conditions stemming from developed country models, these will be 
inappropriate. However, if the IMF is serious about its ambitions in the areas of poverty and 
inequality,  its  policy  of  conditionality  still  is  in  need  of  a  very  careful  review.  And  the 
findings of our study suggest that as long as no better solutions can be found, more freedom 
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Appendix A - Data Description 
Five year averages are used of all variables  
 
IMF program (based on Dreher, 2006). Dummy that equals one if an IMF program has been 
in effect for at least five months in a specific year 
 
Use of IMF credit, percentage of GDP (World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003). 
Use of IMF credit denotes repurchase obligations to the IMF for all uses of IMF resources 
(excluding those resulting from drawings on the reserve tranche). These obligations comprise 
purchases outstanding under the credit tranches, including enlarged access resources, and all 
special facilities (the buffer stock, compensatory financing, extended fund, and oil facilities), 
trust  fund  loans,  and  operations  under  the  structural  adjustment  and  enhanced  structural 
adjustment facilities.  
 
Short-term  debt,  percentage  of  total  external  debt  (World  Bank,  World  Development 
Indicators 2003). Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or 
less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. 
 
Total debt service (% GDP) (World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003). Total debt 
service is the sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in foreign currency, 
goods,  or  services  on  long-term  debt,  interest  paid  on  short-term  debt,  and  repayments 
(repurchases and charges) to the IMF. 
 
Gini-index (Deininger and Squire, 1996, supplemented with  WDI, 2002, by Dreher, 2006).   
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The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or 
households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 
zero represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. See section 
4.2 
 
Theil-index (University of Texas Inequality Project, University of Texas at Austin). Measure 
for industrial pay-inequality between different sectors. See section 4.1 
 
Voting in General Assembly (Dreher & Sturm, 2005) Dummy equaling 1 if the borrowing 
country votes in line with the average of the G7 countries (weighted with their quota in the 
IMF), and 0 otherwise. 
 
Financial  Development  (World  Bank,  World  Development  Indicators  2003).  Proxied  by 
M2/GDP. Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside banks, demand 
deposits  other  than  those  of  the  central  government,  and  the  time,  savings,  and  foreign 
currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government.  
 
Secondary school enrolment, gross % (World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003). 
The  ratio  of  total  enrollment,  regardless  of  age,  to  the  population  of  the  age  group  that 
officially corresponds to secondary education. Secondary education completes the provision 
of basic education that began at the primary level. 
 
Freedom of the Press, index (Freedom House, 2009) Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as 
having a free press; 31 to 60 a partly-free press; 61 to 100 a not-free press (for a detailed  
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description: http://freedomhouse.org/). Period 1979-92: Not free (100), Partly free/ not free 
(60), Partly free (45), Free/ Partly Free (30), Free (0). 
 
International reserves (in months of imports) (World Bank, World Development Indicators 
2003).  Gross  international  reserves  comprise  holdings  of  monetary  gold,  special  drawing 
rights,  the  reserve  position  of  members  in  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  and 
holdings  of  foreign  exchange  under  the  control  of  monetary  authorities.  Reserves  are 
expressed in terms of the number of months of imports of goods and services which could be 
paid for. 
 
Current account balance, percentage of GDP (World Bank, World Development Indicators 
2003). Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods, services, net income, and 
net current transfers. 
 
Currency crisis (Glick,  Reuven; Michael Hutchinson: Banking Crises: How Common are 
Twins?  and  Caprio,  Gerard;  Daniela  Klingebiel:  Episodes  of  Systemic  and  Borderline 
Financial Crises). Dummy equaling 1 if there has been a currency crisis in the year specified 
and 0 otherwise.  
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Appendix B - Summary Statistics 
Variable  Nr. of observations  Mean  Standard deviation 
IMF Program  588  .29  0.35 
Use of IMF credit (% 
GDP) 
482  2.55  4.56 
Gini-index  263  41.61  19.67 
Theil-index  388  0.07  0.40 
Short-term debt (% of 
total debt) 
484  13.8  12.05 
Total debt service (% 
GDP) 
473  5.32  4.08 
Voting in General 
Assembly 
550  0.35  0.11 
Currency crisis  381  0.12  0.20 
Financial Development  523  34.44  23.02 
Secondary school 
enrollment 
552  47.00  28.63 
Freedom of the Press, 
index 
450  54.09  31.15 
International reserves (in 
months of imports) 
465  3.427  2.885 
Current account balance  459  -3.89  7.94 
Appendix C – Regressions explaining Gini- and Theil-coefficients 
Table 6. Regressions for Gini- & Theil-coefficients, GLS 
Dependent variable:  Gini  Dependent variable:  Theil 







Freedom of the Press  -0.0021 (0.88)  Freedom of the Press  0.0001 (0.45) 
Nr of observations  185  Nr of observations  282 
Chi-square (Prob. >F)  2353.05 (0.00)  Chi-square (Prob. >F)  1077.14 (0.00) 
Dummies are included for each country and time period  
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Appendix D - Countries included in the analysis 
Albania   Algeria  Argentina  Bahamas  Bahrain 
Bangladesh  Barbados  Belize  Benin  Bolivia 
Botswana  Brazil  Bulgaria  Burundi  Cameroon 
Central Africa  Chad  Chile  China  Colombia 
Congo, Dem  Congo, Rep  Costa Rica  Cote d'Ivo  Croatia 
Cyprus  Czech Repu  Dominican  Ecuador  Egypt, Ara 
El Salvado  Estonia  Fiji  Gabon  Ghana 
Guatemala  Guinea-Bis  Guyana  Haiti  Honduras 
Hungary  India  Indonesia  Iran, Isla  Israel 
Jamaica  Jordan  Kenya  Korea, Rep  Kuwait 
Latvia  Lithuania  Madagascar  Malawi  Malaysia 
Mali  Malta  Mauritius  Mexico  Morocco 
Myanmar  Namibia  Nepal  Nicaragua  Niger 
Nigeria  Oman  Pakistan  Panama  Papua New 
Paraguay  Peru  Philippine  Romania  Russian Fe 
Rwanda  Saudi Arab  Senegal  Sierra Leo  Singapore 
Slovak Rep  Slovenia  South Africa  Sri Lanka  Syria 
Tanzania  Thailand  Togo  Trinidad  Tunisia 
Turkey  Uganda  Ukraine  United Ara  Uruguay 
Venezuela,  Zambia  Zimbabwe     
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